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Kenilworth

What might the consequences be for increased defence spending?

Although research had been done on The Defence Spending Review 2025, the effects of the decade of austerity and the Government’s current spending budget, all this needed to be tempered by the current war in Iran and the instability of the global economy.

Defence spending was uppermost in the discussion. Several in the group were persistent in challenging the idea that defence spending actually needed to increase, or that the current plans for procurement needed to be re-examined in the rapidly changing nature of modern warfare.  Drones, intelligence and cyber-security seemed to take precedence over the tortuous procurement process involving tanks, aircraft carriers and the like.

Len pointed out that 50% of the current defence budget is taken up by the maintenance of the nuclear armaments in Coulport.  Could this be wound down?   Think Ukraine and its ‘deal’ with Russia to abandon its nuclear weapons…. All were agreed that a) we were not experts in warfare procurement, b) it was widely acknowledged that defence procurement was inefficient (eg, the Covenanter, Churchill and Ajax tank debacles) and c) because of a) we had to be accepting of the military experts making decisions.

Barbara used the ‘home insurance’ policy as an analogy to national security: it was purchased with the hope of not needing it but saw it as a necessary safeguard.  Len asked: safeguarding what?  People? Territory? Overseas Territories such as the Falklands? Tax-dodgers in Dubai?  Sue suggested that our reliance on our public services needed to be questioned – we live in an age of unrealistic and unsustainable high expectation.  Jenny and Margaret agreed that the younger generation seemed to be instilled with a ‘feebleness’ of resilience; National Service could be considered as a way of challenging and motivating young people and may aid the problems of recruitment into the Armed Services.

David made a salient observation that different countries required different defences; even in NATO, those on Russia’s border were more active and motivated to increase defence than the UK, which is more geographically remote. The reliability of the oft quoted percentages of NATO funding by its 32 countries was questioned; that the USA’s claim to be underwriting NATO by more than 50% was inaccurate because of overlapping objectives in non-NATO issues.

If we accepted the premise that defence spending needed to increase, where does the money come from? Circle back to Len’s request to clarify what we were defending. Exactly how much is being spent on maintaining these British Overseas Territories?  New money largely comes from an increase in tax, national insurance and VAT, from cuts to public services or from borrowing, none of which are attractive options.  A short discussion ensued about issuing war bonds, though these are questionable in such volatile times.

Len remained unhappy that a consensus hadn’t been reached as to whether the underlying premise of raising the defence spending had been confirmed.  A vote resulted in an 8 – 1 verdict that spending on defence did need to be increased.  As to how and to what end was left unresolved. Pleased we got the initial premise sorted, though.